This one is p2p: https://github.com/schlagmichdoch/PairDrop (or just try it in https://pairdrop.net/ )

But that also means that you need to keep the page open while the other device downloads.

Another p2p alternative is using webtorrent: https://instant.io/

Ah, I see. Sorry, the text was too long and I’m not dutch so it was hard to spot that for me too.

But I interpret that part differently. I think them saying that there’s an ambiguous section about risks does not necessarily mean that the ambiguity is in the responsibility of those who choose to not implement the detection… it could be the opposite: risks related to the detection mechanism, when a service has chosen to add it.

I think we would need to actually see the text of the proposal to see where is that vague expression used that she’s referring to.

It seems the reason companies are currently allowed to do this in the EU is because there was in 2020 a temporary derogation from certain provisions of the e-Privacy Directive.

But it was temporary, so it will expire in April 2026. With this new law the intention is to make that “voluntary detection” a permanent thing they allow service providers to do, as a norm. The providers still have the choice to not do it, so I don’t think this affects services like signal, as far as I understand.

Thanks for the link, and the clarification (I didn’t know about april 2026)… although it’s still confusing, to be honest. In your link they seem to allude to this just being a way to maintain a voluntary detection that is “already part of the current practice”…

If that were the case, then at which point “the new law forces [chat providers] to have systems in place to catch or have data for law inforcements”? will services like signal, simplex, etc. really be forced to monitor the contents of the chats?

I don’t find in the link discussion about situations in which providers will be forced to do chat detection. My understanding from reading that transcript is that there’s no forced requirement on the providers to do this, or am I misunderstanding?

Just for reference, below is the relevant section translated (emphasis mine).

In what form does voluntary detection by providers take place, she asks. The exception to the e-Privacy Directive makes it possible for services to detect online sexual images and grooming on their services. The choice to do this lies with the providers of services themselves. They need to inform users in a clear, explicit and understandable way about the fact that they are doing this. This can be done, for example, through the general terms and conditions that must be accepted by the user. This is the current practice. Many platforms are already doing this and investing in improving detection techniques. For voluntary detection, think of Apple Child Safety — which is built into every iPhone by default — Instagram Teen Accounts and the protection settings for minors built into Snapchat and other large platforms. We want services to take responsibility for ourselves. That is an important starting point. According to the current proposal, this possibility would be made permanent.

My impression from reading the dutch, is that they are opposing this because of the lack of “periodic review” power that the EU would have if they make this voluntary detection a permanent thing. So they aren’t worried about services like signal/simplex which wouldn’t do detection anyway, but about the services that might opt to actually do detection but might do so without proper care for privacy/security… or that will use detection for purposes that don’t warrant it. At least that’s what I understand from the below statement:

Nevertheless, the government sees an important risk in permanently making this voluntary detection. By permanently making the voluntary detection, the periodic review of the balance between the purpose of the detection and privacy and security considerations disappears. That is a concern for the cabinet. As a result, we as the Netherlands cannot fully support the proposal.

It seems the article is misinterpreting things. It’s not that it’s “voluntary for individual EU states”… but rather “voluntary” for service providers. The service providers don’t have to implement this chat detection if they don’t want to.

The thing is that if they don’t pass something like this, then by April 2026 a bunch of current services that are already doing CP detection would be breaking the law, since the temporary derogation of the e-Privacy Directive will expire. But I don’t think this affects services like signal/simplex who voluntarily choose to not try to detect it.

Where is this explained? the article might be wrong then, because it does state the opposite:

scanning is now “voluntary” for individual EU states to decide upon

It makes it sound like it’s each state/country the one deciding, and that the reason “companies can still be pressured to scan chats to avoid heavy fines or being blocked in the EU” was because of those countries forcing them.

Who’s the one deciding what is needed to reduce “the risks of the of the chat app”? if it’s each country the ones deciding this, then it’s each country who can opt to enforce chat scanning… so to me that means the former, not the latter.

In fact, isn’t the latter already a thing? …I believe companies can already scan chats voluntarily, as long as they include this in their terms, and many do. A clear example is AI chats.

The thing is… that even if there are countries publicly rejecting this, once the infrastructure is in place and a backdoor exists due to it being enforced by some other country, how can you be sure it’s not being used / exploited?

Even in the (hypothetical) case that the government is not using it (regardless of what they might say to the public), I wouldn’t trust that this backdoor would be so secure that nobody else than a government could make use of it.

I believe Germany is now in favor of this new proposal, according to https://fightchatcontrol.eu/

Only Italy, Netherlands, Czech Republic and Poland are against. This seems to be based on “leaked documents from the September 12 meeting of the EU Council’s Law Enforcement Working Party”.

the local sending side has some way to control the state their particle wavefunctions collapse into (otherwise they’re just sending random noise).

Do they? My impression is that, like the article says, “their states are random but always correlated”. I think they are in fact measuring random values on each side, it’s just that they correlate following Schroedinger’s equation.

I believe the intention is not “sending” specific data faster than light… but rather to “create Quantum Keys for secure information transmission”. The information between the quantum particles is correlated in both sides, so they can try to use this random data to generate keys on each side in a way that they can be used to create a secure encryption for communication (a “Quantum Network that will be used for secure communication and data exchange between Quantum Computers”), but the encrypted data wouldn’t travel faster than light.

I always saw I2P as a more modern and distributed onion-routing alternative to Tor.

The thing is that people are used to making use of Tor in different ways than the way they use I2P, but you can also have outproxies (ie. exit nodes/relays) in I2P the same way as in Tor… and you can also host a service inside the Tor network without relying on an exit node, like in I2P. It’s just that people only seem to want to host exit nodes for Tor and not so much for I2P, this led to internal communications in I2P being more common (which is a good thing), whereas in Tor it’s common to use it for anonymous access to the clearnet (which strains the network and causes chokepoints, specially with big downloads or torrent sharing). That’s just a matter of usage, not capability.